undertaken, namely, to examine the Hebrew works of the said maskil from the angle of Hebrew Haskalah of which indeed he has been a part. 2 In his advocacy of Enlightenment, Schnaber preceded the Hebrew German maskilim both in preaching and in practice 2 As I shall discuss it below, I disagree with Graupe's view in his article (cited above) that Schnaber did not belong to the circle of t Hebrew maskilim. The Hebrew maskil started his Haskalah activities long before the formation of the circle of the maskilim: disseminatio of scientific knowledge in the Hebrew language (in his book '1Rt3 1n nl r 1t'n nf [An Essay (of) the Torah and Wisdom], (London, I77 heralded a similar trend of the Hebrew Haskalah. Schnaber stressed, already at this early stage of Hebrew Haskalah, the necessity for the revival of the Hebrew language. In 1784 Schnaber published excerpts from his book on that subject in Hanmeassef, encouraging the editors to proceed with their struggle for Enlightenment, although not through extreme and war-like ways. A detailed description could be found in 
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This content downloaded from 132. 170 This use of the traditional form and style may the presence of traditional views alongside with more advanced ideas. His conservatism is in no w to him; for, in effect, we have found a similar tren writings of some of the other Hebrew maskilim.4 Un 3 Schnaber's utterances on the Hebrew language in Ma'amar Hatorah Vehahochmah, p. 5, are regarded by Cecil Roth as "almost a Haskalah manifesto!" ("The Haskalah in England," p. 368). Roth suggests that Schnaber might have been the author of another early Haskalah work, Sefer Giddul Banim, containing suggestions of educational reforms (ibid., p. 367). Siegfried Stein, in his article on "Sefer Giddul Banim," pp. I68-I69, rejects Roth's suggestion.
Schnaber resembles his contemporary maskilim in this regard for he, too, typifies his generation as a generation of transition.
While all generations are in transition, the one under study may be more representative of an overall transition, from one historic period to another, which lasted for a century, till the end of the Haskalah in the last quarter of the Igth century.
The use of the writings of Maimonides as a springboard for Enlightenment is also quite typical of the maskilim in their search for a guide, an authoritative guide, to enhance their ideas and ideals.5
The explanation cited above regarding the presence of the elements of the new and the old together in Schnaber's Hebrew writings is not fully understood, or at least not expressed, by most students of the period, of its thought and literature.
One suspects that the complexities of the Hebrew Haskalah and its exponents are being ignored at times, for the sake of simplification and generalization. The purpose, it seems, is to make the Hebrew Haskalah more homogeneous, and thus more understandable, than it actually was.
Although these comments do not fully fit the very fine study of Schnaber by Graupe, some generalities in that study are believed to be erroneous. At first sight, writes Graupe, Schnaber would appear, after having read a short of him, as an assimilationist, as an outspoken de Enlightenment, as though he stood close to the ci Me'assfim, the Hebrew enlighteners. A completely picture emerges from his Hebrew writings, writ accordingly, he was not in the circle of the enlig the circle of Mendelssohn, Herz, Euchel and Friedlander.6
Associating "assimilationist" with "an outspoken defender of Enlightenment," even in his context, is rather strange. For it may mislead the reader to believe that the writer is dealing with synonymous terms, namely, that "assimilationist" and "enlightener" are necessarily identical. Further, it appears that Graupe does not believe that Schnaber has anything to do with the Hebrew maskilim, their movement, their writings, and their ideology. Although Schnaber may not have adhered to the same philosophical principles of the Wolffian school which were held by Mendelssohn, the two still have many other ideas in common in the spheres of Judaism, theology, and Hebrew Haskalah. The ambivalent attitude toward tradition on the one hand, and toward enlightenment on the other, is typical of both maskilim.7
There is the attempt on the side of both maskilim to preserve Judaism and to defend it in the face of extreme anti-Jewish views among the European enlighteners. Yet they also endeavored to introduce Enlightenment into Judaism. Putting Mendelssohn and Friedlander together is not as simple as it may appear, as indeed any one familiar with the subject at hand surely knows. In addition, the circle of Hame'assfim was not a unified body with unified Weltanschauung; the editors of Hame'assef changed, and more often its writers did.
Schnaber's views, as discussed below, indeed show his part in the Hebrew Haskalah. In spite of my disagreement with some of Graupe's views on Schnaber, I think that his conclusions are quite meritorious; Schnaber should be considered 6 Graupe, "Mordechai Gumpel (Levison)," pp. 5-8. 7 Cf. Moshe Mendelssohn: Bechavlei Masoreth, pp. 9, I8-I9, 75-84. as a definite representative of Enlightenment, but only of one segment of Haskalah.
My discussion below attempts to prove that. Schnaber's first book, n,nrm ,inn i,i 3K m, was published in I77I in London, where he stayed for his medical education and practice. The book is an encyclopedia of knowledge dealing with mathematics, physics, and some other sciences, while leaving metaphysics for the second volume that has never been published.8 In addition, a long introductory essay in defense of the study of the sciences, shows, or endeavors to show, that Judaism has no objection to the study of these sciences. The essay further analyzes some aspects of traditional Judaism and its books from an Enlightenment point of view. This kind of apologetical introduction which essentially wishes to show the compatibility of Judaism and wisdom could be found in the writings of the other maskilim in a way that it may reflect both a state of mind of the given writer, as well as the state of mind of his cultural and religious milieu. Occasionally, one is hesitant as to whether or not the attempt to show the compatibility of Judaism and wisdom, that is, the sciences, actually reflects the philosophy of a given writer at the time of writing; perhaps it reflects his awareness of and his reaction to the traditional views of his contemporaries, and thus his writings may assume a compromising tone for strategical reasons.
Unlike a writer such as Isaac Satanow, in whose writings one can detect a shift from the stand that at first shows the rapport between Judaism and secular knowledge, and subsequently reflects a stand that alludes to the dependence of the former on the latter,9 it is my opinion that in th of Schnaber the compatibility of both Judaism a studies is an integral part of his established Weltans We do not see a development here from the form toward Judaism to the latter, but indeed the sam prevails in all his Hebraic writings. Thus the cont books, his style, and his manner of presentation follows: Haskalah and secular knowledge are not t .tpsY? nq 1 n p . n n"lmt w . n 3 ] hrv nnrnr m nn 5no nr .} ,rmnn " D rWn ^ tw 1 ibid., p. i, of the introduction. 12 ibid., p. 6: rnnnltrl nrln"n rlnn 1 nM3I nrl. rln ;rnnft iniR"l nrixv .ns^Ken 3 nm 'p^Tn7: rmnn nir i nnm.ni rnr"Tp t.nsr. n.t.n .t*/T ITTV7nP naMIT NIOn at times sound contradictory. Thus he explains biblical miracles in a scientific way,13 claims that secular knowledge does not have any connection whatever with any foundation of our faith,14 yet maintains elsewhere in the book that without the knowledge of certain secular disciplines one may not be able to observe a given religious law.15
In a like manner, Schnaber endeavors to present his case with regard to talmudic Judaism. The various parts of the Talmud are full of nmnn, i.e., secular knowledge, and the rabbis have never ordered to discard the study of such 15 Without the knowledge of chronology and geography we would not know the exact timing of Shabath and the holidays (ibid., p. 24).
16 ibid., p. 8: ".lnlinln rtip npnn n 11m i" 17 ibid., p. 6: = =1p 1-1:: 1 "T QMM1D:7n 'W pI" ",.~nn 'w;,n I.ini prlpwn -nis .,nr pn nTpnn r, that the cause for the state of Judaism in his time a result, Torah and the teaching of Torah are now in of unwise people, he writes, who do not equip the y the proper understanding of the Talmud, or for th of Judaism. This kind of teaching creates confus mind of the youths; to confront this confusion forbid the learning of philosophy and of secular Schnaber rejects this attitude on the part of th well as the old-fashion teaching of the Talmud; i suggests that the Talmud should be taught with casuistry, in accordance with the to, the straight common-sense understanding of a text.19 It is a ver policy to persecute those who seek in=n, for it lessening of Torah, according to this maskil. The the sciences and secular knowledge is left to "st (ntT), in his words, who do not comprehend the act thus they are unable to bridge between the scie Judaism.20 Denial of logical examination is com Schnaber to the expulsion form 1-s p.21 One su the logical examination is applied by the writer to ni3n.n S?tn, the reasons for the precepts. Going in the footsteps of medieval Jewish philosophers, and heralding a similar trend in the Hebrew Haskalah, Schnaber feels the necessity of giving a rational explanation to the mitzvoth.22
These views by Schnaber so far are indicative of his Enlightenment tendencies; however, they do not represent by themselves any direct trend toward reforms or changes in the Halachah. An important step in the direction of religious reform could be found, however, in this early work of Schnaber.
In his discussion of the reasons why nr b:=a lm1n, the Oral Law, had not been given in writing, Schnaber cites Maimonides' explanation which is based on the Talmud: Things given orally may not be transcribed in writing, for the limitation of language is bound to cause confusion and conflicting understanding of the text. It is for this reason that m-nm :nnn, the Written Law, had been given in writing, for it is the essence of Judaism; however, its interpretation had been given orally through tradition to allow r';1 r" n n= [Supreme Court, or Sanhedrin] to decide which is the right tradition and which is the right interpretation of the Torah.23
Schnaber neither accepts nor rejects this explanation by Maimonides; instead, he suggests another explanation whose original author is also that medieval Jewish philosopher, and which is taken out of context and applied here. 24 Accordingly, 22 Following especially Maimonides whom he cites; see ibid., pp. 7-8. it is not the language which may cause misunderstand misinterpretation, but the laws of the Torah which w some changes in the face of the changing times a changing places. To prevent the necessary changes, th itself has forbidden any additions or subtractions, f would cast some doubt as to the origin and authent the Torah and its laws. Yet in order to provide th mechanism for the maintenance of the original la Supreme Religious Court, or the rabbis of each gen are given the authority to add v"i0o, i.e., prevent protective fences around the essence.25 Now Schna his own contribution to the subject: "And if the O were in writing, the rabbis would not have been able t any innovation, and also the masses would not have their decrees except what is written; for this reas rabbis were given the interpretation of the nisn a branching of the 3,l"t." 26 In other words, the Or that is the legal interpretation of the Written It is important to note that in the context Maimonides is dealing with the necessity of having the courts as the sole interpreters of the law, whereas Schnaber is using the quote from Maimonides to emphasize the necessity of change in the law, and the provision in the law itself for that change.
Indeed this maskil is endeavoring to establish one very important enlightenment idea, that of the relativity of the divine law itself and its dependence on its time and its place.27 Whereas the deists of the I7th and I8th centuries have been using this idea as an argument in order to show that this law cannot be absolute, ergo cannot be of a divine origin,28 the Hebrew maskil is far from desiring this result. To him, the law is divine; however, it is not absolute so as not to be obsolete. In other words, the divine legislator has made provisions within the law for necessary changes which are Checking the source, The History of the Jews in Great Britain, II, p. II8-II9, we find the following information: "The moment his bigoted brethren heard his notions of enlightenment, before they ever read his book, they condemned him, as an infidel and most immoral man, and nicknamed him 'Raa Gumpel,' (Gumpel the wicked.)." There is no way to check Margoliouth's source, for he cites no source; however, no such expression could be found in t3"W11 l :1WnS [The Prushim's Reply] (London, 1775 ?), an orthodox attack on Schnaber. Moreover, Schnaber's name is not mentioned at all, but is referred to as "Gershon."
Further, the combination "Raa Gumpel" is grammatically wrong. On the other hand, the anonymous writer refers to Gershon's (= Schnaber's) friend and fellow-heretic as ".VI' 7'" (ibid., p. 4). "Rac 'avish," is probably a reference to one Rawitch. Is Schnaber's second Hebrew work was an exegesis on the book of Ecclesiastes, which came out in Hamburg in I784. In Not all of the views expressed in the book are that conservative; obviously, many are not. We note Schnaber's attempt to doubt the authenticity of the Masorah,42 and to accept unauthorized versions of the Bible which he himself has not even seen.43 He further seems to feel that the coming of the Messiah is not to be regarded as one of the principles of Judaism. Indeed, Schnaber is not original in his view, surely he would not wish to appear as such; he cites Joseph Albo as his authoritative support. The coming of the Messiah, to him, is the coming of everlasting peace, and the belief of all in one creator; it is the time of the cessation of religious hatred.44 Clearly, one can note the optimistic hope of the Enlightenment for a new age to come.45 Moreover, there is a tendency on the part of the enlighteners to limit the principples of religion to its broader base, that which is common to all positive religions, that which has been the cornerstone of the natural religion.46 As we shall later see, Schnaber limits the principles of Judaism to one.
The attitude toward the mitzvoth and their observance on the part of a given maskil is sufficient in most cases to one of the indicators of his stand with regard to the quest of Enlightenment and religion. We note two trends in book: a. An attempt to preserve the mitzvoth without change; b. Allusions to the possibility of abolishing mitzvoth. On the one hand, Schnaber seems to be a maximal namely, he would not allow any mitzvah to be overlooked; abolition of one would necessarily bring about the colla cerning the attempt on the part of the sages to eliminate the bo from the canon. In addition, he writes that he had been told about an ancient scroll at the king's library in Copenhagen which did not have the controversial three verses. He tried to look for the scroll, could not find it, for someone else had taken it; as he was in a hurry he could not go to that man, thus he has not seen it himself. 44 ibid., p. 37b: IWR't g1vn '"1 gltn; i Ri rV rwn n [. .] should be able to remember God always, day and to love goodness and reject evil without performin which should remind them of the fundamentals, pe should not be any [place] for all the mitzvoth." 49 seems possible that the road to religious reform is by this maskil, it is not at all probable. Som
Mendelssohn, who believed that a change in the law only through God and through another revelation to the one at Sinai,50 Schnaber is not even talki of the immediate future, but of some Messianic times. At that time "there will not be the need for so many mitzvoth," he writes. 51 The Torah was given originally in order to alleviate a yoke, but not to burden its followers, says the maskil as he elaborates upon a Maimonidian idea.52 It is thus up to the lawgiver "to remove it [that is, the Torah] should it be for our good. Hame'assef, very much like Wessely whom he mentioned, although not by name, for publishing satire, and for arousing controversies (Hame'assef, I, I784, p. 184). The editors apologized, explaining that they had never intended to cause controversy, and that they regarded Schnaber as their strong supporter (ibid.). In the issue that preceded, the editors published a short review of Schnaber's book Tochahath Megilah which contained some very favorable expressions about the author in spite of the fact that in his book he opposes Mendelssohn in his interpretation of the book of Koheleth (ibid., pp. I75-I76).
1nri "'T'm lWl'¢ VljW.56 In addition to the Maimonidian discussion of the thirteen principles, Schnaber has his own interpretation of Maimonides' text with a contemporary, more up-to-date flavor. The nuclear idea of Schnaber is that Judaism is to be narrowed down to one principle, and not to thirteen or three as suggested by Maimonides and Albo, respectively. That one fundamental of Judaism is the belief in the existence of God. All others are secondary to it, stem from it, and do not have the same weight, vitality and significance as the belief in the existence of God.
Very much like the previous book, Yesodei Hatorah has the two tendencies mentioned above: Extreme traditionalism on the one hand, and references to the possibility of religiou reform, on the other hand; except that now we have no long mere allusion to reform, but indeed a direct discussion of it.
There is no doubt in my mind as to the sincerity of Schnaber's traditional tendencies. As a matter of fact, I think that a great portion of the volume is devoted to the defen of Judaism against the current anti-religious writings. Schnaber cites many of the arguments which had been thrown at Judaism by the deists and the atheists, and h refutes them one by one. Such are the claims that Moses had fabricated the Torah by himself, and thus that the stories in the Torah regarding the miracles and the prophecies are false He offers historical and scientific evidence to prove the authenticity of biblical stories.57 He further endeavors prove that immortality of the soul had been alluded to in the Torah, contrary to the well-known argument that it had not and that it was introduced by Jesus, implying that Christianity has the sole divine truth.58 Schnaber seems to reject the deistic argument that, even if God had given the law to Israel, he has since disappeared from the scene.59
Although Schnaber seems to accept the notion of the relativity of all traditions, another of the deistic beliefs, his acceptance clearly has a purpose: to show that various external traditions have indeed authenticated the Jewish tradition as written in the Torah. Now if even some non-Jews have accepted "the words of Moses, may he rest in peace, why is it that the children of Israel do not believe in the Torah of God," 60 he asks. His arguments are used against forces from within and without the Jewish spheres. All in all, writes Schnaber, "those who deny both the Torah and its fundamentals have not found any demonstrative proof to authenticate their words and to fight us." 61
It is no doubt the writing of a true believer, of a maskil who is versed in the European culture, yet is aware of the necessity of religion-to him the Jewish religion-for the preservation of social order, in effect for the preservation of the human race.62 The worship of God, the deeds (mitzvoth), are stressed as essential to religion.63 He does accept also unconditionally the Oral Law.64
However, Schnaber adheres to the views expressed previously in his first book concerning the reasons why n;r W7v nrinn had been given orally, and thus he reiterates the importance of this legal tool given to the rabbis of each gener this he adds another aspect of great significance: T for the precepts [Inws;in ,vn] are not included Law (which has been put in writing since) for the that the Oral Law itself was first given orally; order to allow for the subtleties of the oral interp against the awkward, dependent, and inflexible na written interpretation.66 "And if the interpret scriptures had been put in writing, there wou been power [authority] in the hands of the sages t a thing as per the necessity of time and place, for would not accept from them any innovation except written. For this reason it necessitated that the in of the mitzvoth and their like, and the branching dinim be given to the wise men in every generatio Discussion of nnn';t ,Swu, it must be emphasiz a vital role in the Haskalah writings in that it step in the direction of religious reform. The r for the precepts in that age of reason helped s Judaism; however, they have been also instrum deterioration of the religious observance. At rational explanation for the mitzvoth became the v for doing away with the observance of the mitzvot when the explanation emphasized some temporal as somehow looked rather irrelevant in the then modern context.
It is ironic that the talmudic apprehension concerning the reasons for the precepts has materialized.68 the rabbis of each generation to interpret the precepts are of utmost importance.
Another significant aspect of Schnaber's writing is the growing awareness of time in its relation to man and God.
It appears that Schnaber feels that all matters involving man fall under the rule of time; time implies change, thus the principle of change in all human matters. Included in the latter are all religious matters which evolve around man. The only exclusion which does not fall under the rule of time is the existence of God. As such, it is the one and only fundamental of religion, according to Schnaber. A prophet may temporarily nullify the mitzvoth; indeed it is obligatory to follow that nnx a,N [true prophet], and the one who does not obey his instructions is rebelling against God. The only exception, according to the Hebrew maskil, is the above mentioned fundamental of religion, which is immutable.69 It must be emphatically pointed out that Schnaber is very careful to establish the Maimonidian sources as an authority for his contentions. However, I believe this great awareness of the mutability of the mitzvoth and their dependence on the changing time is one of the best indicators of the age of secularism. To be more correct, it is an indicator of the period of transition from the holy to the profane.
In 
